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BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(Harvard Univ. Press 2010). Pp. 280. Hardcover. $29.95.
Bruce Ackerman warns us that we may soon witness The Decline and Fall of the
American Republic. What exactly are we being warned about, and how should we
react? I will sketch a framework for thinking about these questions and then apply the
framework both to Ackerman's general thesis and to his more specific claims about civil-
military relations.
Ackerman wants to "sound[] the alarm" about the risk that the Madisonian republic
will fail.2 Depending upon how exactly this risk is specified, the outcome might be
plebiscitary democracy, or pseudo-democracy, or else outright authoritarian rule. The
main dangers are an "extremist presidency" 3 that "may become the springboard for an
authoritarian takeover" 4 and a "politicized military" 5 that slips off the bonds of civilian
control.
One useful lens through which to evaluate an argument of this sort is risk
regulation, here applied to political risks. In this framework, constitutions and other
instruments of public law can be understood as devices for regulating political risks in
cost-justified ways. Many of the standard tools of risk regulation analysis can be applied,
with appropriate modifications, to analyze political risks and to evaluate the institutions
that attempt to manage those risks.
Within this framework, I have three questions to pose to Ackerman. As to each
question, I will first address the general line of Ackerman's argument and then address
the specific issues surrounding civil-military relations.
* John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Prepared as a response to the Tanner Lectures
given by Bruce Ackerman at Princeton University, April 7-9, 2010. I thank the organizers and participants,
especially Philip Pettit and Jeff Tulis, and thank Jack Goldsmith, Matthew Stephenson, Mark Tushnet and John
Yoo for helpful comments.
1. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010).
2. Id. at 4-6, 119-20.
3. Id. at 15-41.
4. Id. at 40.
5. Id. at 43-64.
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1. WHAT HARMS?
What exactly are the risks that Ackerman wants to warn us about? "The Decline
and Fall of the American Republic" is an ambiguous concern. Does it mean that the
American polity will no longer be a Madisonian-republican polity, but will still be a
democracy in some sense - a plebiscitary, president-centered democracy, with
legislators and judges (and perhaps also bureaucrats) relegated to the sidelines, but with
free and fair elections? 6 Or does it mean the Fall of the Republic in Plutarch's sense -
the disappearance not only of republicanism but of democracy as well, and a transition to
authoritarianism, either openly or in the form of pseudo-democracy with pseudo-
elections? The risk of a transition from republicanism to plebiscitary democracy is more
plausible but less grave; the risk of (de jure or de facto) authoritarianism is more grave
and less plausible. The ambiguity allows Ackerman to combine these two elements in
such a way as to make his warnings seem both plausible and grave. However, if we pin
down the nature of the threatened harm, I believe that either the plausibility or gravity of
the warnings will suffer. Perhaps Ackerman believes that plebiscitary democracy is an
unstable regime that inevitably degenerates into authoritarianism, but this is an uncertain
extrapolation from what he actually says, as well as being an intrinsically dubious claim.
There is a similar ambiguity, on a smaller scale, about the nature of the harms
Ackerman fears in the specific setting of civil-military relations. In some passages,
Ackerman's concern appears to be that the military will display excessive autonomy from
politics, while in others, the concern appears to be that the military will display
insufficient autonomy from politics. Of course both these things would be bad, and I
think Ackerman means to say that the "politicized military" is a military that is
simultaneously too independent of presidential control (or civilian control generally) and
yet also intervenes in civilian politics. However, it is jarring to see Ackerman caution
against the charismatic presidency in Chapter One, and then caution against the
excessively autonomous military in Chapter Two, when the former is the canonical cure
for the latter.8 The classic check on excessive bureaucratic autonomy, military or
otherwise, is a Weberian plebiscitary President who has sufficient electoral and
charismatic legitimacy to bring the (military) bureaucracy to heel. 9 Weber's position has
a second-best logic from which Ackerman could profit: in an imperfect world, the
6. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that "the death of the Republic does not necessarily mean
the end of democracy") (emphasis in original). This leaves the ambiguity unresolved.
7. More accurately, the sense attributed to Plutarch by modem translators and editors. See, e.g.,
PLUTARCH, THE FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC: Six LIVES (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Group rev. ed.
2006). Ackerman's title conflates the fall of the Republic with Edward Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire. Between the fall of the Republic and the decline of the Empire, however, there lay several
centuries (depending upon when the decline is dated), and new peaks of prosperity and glory.
8. A final ambiguity, related to the foregoing, is that Ackerman seems unsure whether the problem is that
the military has an excessively autonomous culture or an excessively partisan one. At one point Ackerman
gives statistics to support the latter possibility, showing that a high percentage of the officer corps register as
Republican. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 61-62. Yet if this is the key source of divergence between the
preferences of the military and of the civilian leadership, one would expect less friction when a Republican
holds the White House. The facts do not bear this out; conflicts between the military and the White House were
at least as serious under the second Bush as under Clinton. See John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J.
2277, 2287-92, 2301 (2009).
9. The locus classicus is MAX WEBER, The President of the Reich, in WEBER: POLITICAL WRIrINGS 304,
304-08 (Peter Lassman & Ronald Speirs eds., 1994).
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charismatic presidency, however undesirable in itself, may save the larger system from
the pathologies that it otherwise generates. 10
2. LoW-PROBABILITY EVENTS?l1
Let us assume that there is some well-defined set of political risks in the
neighborhood, and also that epistemically warranted probabilities12 can be attached to
those risks. Well, what are those probabilities? For concreteness, let us focus on the most
serious risk that Ackerman discerns: the risk that American presidentialism will
degenerate into the rule of one man. Does Ackerman really think that risk of a coup by
Barack Obama or some successor is appreciably higher than, say, the 1 in 250,000
chance that the giant asteroid 99942 Apophis will strike Earth in the year 2036? 13 If the
risk is sufficiently low, then even if the harms would be high should the risk materialize,
the expected harm may be low, and costly institutional precautions against autocracy
may not be cost-justified.
Let me here record my own probability assessment, which is that the risk of a coup
by the executive - an autogolpe - is vanishingly low in America in 2010, or for the
foreseeable future. I should state (what I take to be) the epistemic warrant for this view,
both in historical and in comparative terms.
First, as to the historical evidence, even the most powerful "constitutional
dictators" in American history, Lincoln and Roosevelt, felt politically constrained to hold
elections, even in the depths of war and economic crisis. If America were to have an
executive coup, it would probably have happened long before now. The existence of a
long line of jeremiads against presidential Caesarism - books by James Burnham and
Arthur Schlesinger are only the most familiar examplesl 4 - makes each new doomsayer
marginally less plausible than the preceding one.
To be sure, the risk of autocracy might be modeled as a "fat-tail risk" or "Taleb
distribution," in which there are repeated rewards from expansive presidential power,
accompanied by a small constant hazard of a very large loss. Yet it is unclear whether
this is the right model; a claim that some risk follows a Taleb distribution is always
10. See Sven Eliaeson, Constitutional Caesarism: Weber's Politics in their German Context, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO WEBER 131, 143 (Stephen Turner ed., 2000).
11. A familiar issue, relevant here, is the distinction between risk and uncertainty. If the analyst can assign
probabilities to the relevant risks, we are in the domain of risk properly so-called; if not, then we are in the
domain of uncertainty. (If the analyst can neither attach probabilities to outcomes, nor even specify the range of
possible outcomes, then we are in the domain of radical ignorance). Ackerman sometimes seems to employ a
risk-based framework, see, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 12 (calling for "measures that might sensibly
reduce the risk"), and I will follow suit. An uncertainty-based framework would require my second question to
be translated into a different language, but the substance would remain unchanged; the first and third questions
would be unaffected.
12. For an explanation of the qualifier "epistemically warranted," see Adrian Vermeule, Eclectic Decision
Theory, JOTWELL: CONSTITuTIONAL LAW (Oct. 27, 2009), http://conlaw.jotwell.comleclectic-decision-
theory,
13. Press Release, NASA, NASA Refines Asteroid Apophis' Path Toward Earth (Oct. 7, 2009), available
at http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2009/oct/HQ_0 9 -232_ApophisUpdate.html.
14. See Jack Goldsmith, The Accountable Presidency, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 1, 2010),
hup://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/the-accountable-presidency.
15. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND
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difficult to falsify, as the claim itself implies that the disaster scenario is extremely
unlikely to be observed in any given time frame. What is clear is that even in periods of
far greater instability than exists today or is likely to exist tomorrow, the core of the
constitution remained intact. For his part, Ackerman gives us almost no affirmative
evidence that the risk of autocracy is real, putting aside his vivid literary scenarios.
Second, there is by now some increasingly solid evidence in comparative politics
on risk factors for dictatorship.16 One of the most striking findings in this literature is
that the best safeguard for democracy is wealth.17 No democracy has fallen in a nation
whose average per capita income was greater than a little over $6,000 in 1995 dollars.18
(In Weimar Germany in 1933, average per capita income was $3,556).19 Stated in 2008
dollars, average per capita income in the United States is no less than $39,751.20 It is
unclear whether this extremely robust correlation reflects underlying causal forces, but if
it does, the United States is unlikely to become a dictatorship in the foreseeable future
simply because of its enormous wealth.
What if anything might cause the association between wealth and the stability of
democracy? One account is that "the intensity of distributional conflicts is lower at
higher income levels."21 On this model, as income rises, the marginal utility of further
increases in income declines, so the relatively poor will have less to gain (in utility
terms) from subverting the democratic order in order to redistribute wealth to
themselves, while the relatively rich will have less to lose from majoritarian
redistribution under democracy. The poor will accept less redistribution, the rich will
accept more, the set of policies that are politically acceptable to both sides expands, and
no social group thinks it is worthwhile to gamble on a bid for dictatorship. All this is at
the research frontier of comparative politics, so uncertainties abound. At a minimum,
however, Ackerman ought to address the risk factors more systematically, and with
attention to the comparative evidence.
Similar points apply to the risk of a coup by the military. There is a crucial
ambiguity here about whether Ackerman envisages a military coup against the President
or a military coup in support of the President as being the more serious threat.2 2 Again,
either would be bad, but the two possibilities are inconsistent alternatives in the sense
that both cannot occur. It is not inconsistent, however, to believe that both risks are
extremely low. Above, I have given some comparative evidence for the low risk of an
authoritarian presidential-military coup in wealthy democracies. As to a military coup
against the President, the very bureaucratization of the military that Ackerman
16. Portions of this paragraph and the next are adapted from Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Tyrannophobia, (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 276, Harvard Univ. Pub. Law, Working Paper
No. 09-44, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1473858.
17. See Adam Przeworski et al., What Makes Democracies Endure?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 39, 40-41 (1996).
18. See id; see also ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY: HISTORICAL STATISTICS 58-69, 87-89,
100-01, 105, 110, 142-48, 180-87, 218-24 (2003).
19. MADDISON, supra note 18, at 62.
20. Per Capita Personal Income by State, 1990 to 2010, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO: BUREAU OF
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, http://bber.unm.edulecon/us-pci.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
21. Przeworski et al., supra note 17, at 41 (citing SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL
BASES OF POLITICS 51 (1981).
22. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 43-64.
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underscores means that charismatic generals like MacArthur are less in evidence today.
The recent civil-military conflicts that Ackerman details seem like penny-ante stuff
compared to McClellan's outright disobedience to Lincoln as enemy troops moved
within striking distance of Washington, or MacArthur's ominous suggestion that
generals owe their allegiance to "the country and its Constitution" rather than to "those
who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of Govemment." 23
Furthermore, no general on the scene today has anything like the popular following that
would be necessary to support a coup.
3. SELF-DEFEATING PRECAUTIONS
Suppose that Ackerman were to identify political risks that are well-defined and
substantial, as opposed to conjectural (however vivid the literary scenarios on offer). The
final question is what precautions to take against those risks, and the answer is to take
only those precautions whose benefits exceed their costs. 24 One problem is that
precautions may impose excessive collateral costs, like designing houses as concrete
bunkers capable of withstanding a strike by 99942 Apophis. Ackerman focuses on the
Type I error - the risks and costs of excessive presidential and military power - but
says very little about the Type II error, the risks and costs of insufficient presidential or
military power. The run-up to World War II illustrates the costs of a constitutional order
that is excessively risk-averse about presidential power. Legal scholars like Edward
Corwin accused Franklin D. Roosevelt of being a tyrant for his destroyers-for-bases deal,
which circumvented Congress; but Roosevelt has been vindicated by the judgment of
history. Presidential power should be neither minimized nor maximized, but optimized.
The same should be true for military power and autonomy. Nations facing increased
security threats rationally afford the military greater leeway.
A second problem is that precautions against political risks may even prove self-
defeating, in the sense that they exacerbate the very risks they are intended to prevent. I
will mention only one major example of the latter concern; the separation of executive
and legislative powers might increase, rather than reduce, the risk of executive
dictatorship.25 Suppose that in a system with an independently elected president,
constitutional designers set up elaborate vetogates, legislative and judicial oversight, and
other checks and balances, all with an eye to minimizing the risks of executive
dictatorship. However, these checks and balances create gridlock and make it difficult to
pass necessary reforms. Where the status quo becomes increasingly unacceptable to
many, as in times of economic or political crisis, the public demands or at least accepts a
dictator who can sweep away the institutional obstacles to reform. 26 Here the very
elaborateness of the designers' precautions against dictatorship creates pent-up public
demand that itself leads to dictatorship. Comparative politics provides (contested)
23. 97 CONG. REC. app. A4721, A4722 (1951) (statement of General Douglas MacArthur), quoted in Yoo,
supra note 8, at 2284-85.
24. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).
25. This paragraph is adapted from Posner & Vermeule, supra note 16.
26. See, e.g., Jonathan Hartlyn, Presidentialism and Colombian Politics, in 2 THE FAILURE OF
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evidence for this story, especially from Latin America. 27
Likewise, the New Deal, which Ackerman famously believes amounted to a
"constitutional moment" of higher lawmaking, can be understood as our brush with the
Latin American scenario, in which Roosevelt achieved near-dictatorial stature precisely
because he seemed the best hope for overcoming the excessive status quo bias of the
Madisonian constitution. Finally, as Ackerman points out, the separation of powers can
undermine political control of the military if it allows the military to "play its civilian
masters against each other." 28 Thus, one comparative study of civil-military relations
finds that civilian control is greater in the United Kingdom than in the United States. 29
Where does Ackerman stand on the separation of powers? Sometimes he suggests
that the separation of powers exacerbates the risk of a "runaway presidency" 30 and of a
politicized military. 3 1 Yet in other passages, he suggests that the goal should be to
reinvigorate the Madisonian system, whose central and praiseworthy feature is precisely
that it slows down the pace of political change. 32 Given that the gridlock arising from the
separation of executive and legislative powers is plausibly a risk factor for the
dictatorship that Ackerman fears, and given that the separation of powers tends to
produce a degree of military autonomy that Ackerman seems to find excessive,
reinvigorating the separation of powers might simply recreate the conditions that
Ackerman laments and indeed exacerbate the risks that Ackerman warns us against.
In other writings, Ackerman suggests fusing executive and legislative powers in a
parliamentary regime, but with a written constitution and judicial oversight, as in some
continental democracies. 33 Yet Weimar, the implicit backdrop to many of Ackerman's
most lurid scenarios of dictatorship, was just such a regime (although judicial review was
infrequently exercised).34 If we put Weimar aside as a fledgling, unconsolidated
democracy in the throes of various economic and social crises, does this not strengthen
the view that economics and demography matter more than institutions, and that the
consolidated and fabulously wealthy American democracy circa 2011 is extremely
unlikely to slide into authoritarianism?
27. See id; Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Diference?, in 2 THE
FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA, supra note 26, at 3, 5-8; Przeworski
et al., supra note 17, at 44-46. The Latin American evidence is contested in Jost ANTONIO CHElBUB,
PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1-3 (2007), which argues that the correlation
between presidentialism and dictatorship is merely an artifact of selection effects: polities that are less stable to
begin with are more likely to have presidential systems.
28. Yoo, supra note 8, at 2304.
29. DEBORAH D. AvANT, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND MILITARY CHANGE: LESSONS FROM PERIPHERAL
WARS 21-23 (1994).
30. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 6, 33, 89.
31. Id. at 43.
32. See id. at 148-49.
33. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation ofPowers, 113 HARv. L. REv 633 (2000).
34. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 6-8 (2d ed. 1997).
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Both here and throughout, I am not so much confident that Ackerman is wrong as
uncertain what his views actually are; or if I do understand them, they seem internally
inconsistent in important respects. My main suggestion, then, is that an analytic
framework that sees public law as a tool for regulating political risks would help clarify
Ackerman's claims sufficiently so that we can evaluate their merits.
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